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CRIMINAL SENTENCING UNDER THE
ADVISORY GUIDELINES AND THE EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE
MEGAN PREUSKER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A judge is faced with the following dilemma: Defendant
committed a crime in 2000. By the time he has been tried,
convicted, and faces sentencing, it is now 2005. In the interim, a
new version of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual
("Guidelines") has come into effect, changing the range of the
sentence for the crime from eighteen to twenty-four months in
2000 to twenty-seven to thirty-three months in 2005. The judge is
now faced with a decision whether to apply the lesser sentence
under the older version of the Guidelines, or whether to apply the
increased sentence under the version of the Guidelines now in
effect. 1

* Megan Preusker received her J.D. in May 2012 from The John Marshall
Law School. She would like to thank her family for their continued support.
1. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), the answer to this question was fairly straightforward. The
Circuit Courts uniformly held that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clause to
apply a later version of the Guidelines if they applied retroactively and
subjected the defendant to an increased quantum of punishment. See United
States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216, 218 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases from all of
the other Circuit Courts of Appeals and joining them in holding that federal
sentencing Guidelines, if applied retroactively to increase the amount of
punishment attached to a crime, violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). This
hypothetical scenario is based upon the facts in United States v. Demaree, 459
F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2006), which was decided shortly after Booker. The
defendant in Demaree pleaded guilty to wire fraud and tax offenses. Id. at 792.
The 2000 version of the Sentencing Guidelines was in effect at the time she
committed the crimes, subjecting her to a sentencing range of eighteen to
twenty-four months imprisonment. Id. The version of the guidelines in effect
at the time the defendant was sentenced resulted in a higher range of twentyseven to thirty-three months. Id. Rather than sentence her under the
Guidelines in effect at the time she committed her crime, as the courts had
done prior to the Booker decision, the judge sentenced her to a term of thirty
months under the revised guidelines. Id. The Seventh Circuit upheld this
sentence on appeal. Id. at 795. This marked a divergence from the Miller line
of cases and was really the emergence of the current debate over the
implication and application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to sentencing
guidelines.
435
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The Ex Post Facto Dilemma

The Guidelines direct a sentencing judge to apply the version
in effect at the time the defendant is sentenced, unless doing so
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 2 Yet a direction such as
this begs the question of what, exactly, is an ex post facto law and
whether the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated by the application of
upwardly revised sentencing guidelines, even though the
Guidelines are only advisory. A question as serious as this goes to
the heart of the constitutional guarantee that there will be no ex
post facto laws. 3 The answer is not an easy one, and in fact has
caused a split among the Circuit Courts of Appeals.4
B.

A Guide to this Comment

This Comment will focus on the application of the Ex Post

Facto Clause to the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Part II
will discuss the roots of the Ex Post Facto Clause in the
Constitution and the interpretation of the Clause in early case

law.5 That section will also focus on the application of the Ex Post
Facto Clause to sentencing guidelines for criminal defendants and
the issues that have emerged after the Supreme Court declared in
United States v. Booker that the Guidelines are advisory only and
not binding on the courts.6 Part III will introduce the circuit split
2. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 111.11 (1992) (amended 1993).
The relevant portion of the statute states as follows:
§ 1B1. 11. Use of Guidelines Manual in Effect on Date of Sentencing
(a) The court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that
the defendant is sentenced.
(b) (1) If the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in
effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex
post facto clause of the United States Constitution, the court shall use
the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction
was committed.
18 U.S.C. § 111.11.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
4. See United States v. Ortiz, 621 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that
the question of whether the "application of a guideline amended after the date
of an offense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause under the advisory Guidelines
regime, as it did when the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory, has
divided the courts of appeals") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
See also Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795 (holding that the retroactive application of
enhanced sentencing guidelines does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause,
since the sentencing guidelines are merely advisory and have no legal or
binding effect on the courts). But see United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094,
1100 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting the holding in Demaree and concluding that
"the proper approach is ... to conduct an 'as applied' constitutional analysis,
not the sort of facial analysis conducted in Demaree") (internal citation
omitted).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Calder v. Bull,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
6. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987); Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
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that has emerged in the wake of this decision.7 It will discuss,
analyze, and evaluate the arguments on both sides.8 Part IV will
reiterate the concerns inherent in the Ex Post Facto Clause
analysis and note that more recent cases have followed the D.C.
Circuit in adopting a "substantial risk" standard.9 In light of these
factors, this Comment will propose that the Seventh Circuit
reconsider its holding in United States v. Demaree and reject a
simple facial analysis.' 0 It will also propose the idea of adopting a
presumption that the retroactive application of increased
sentencing guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause,
but still allowing the courts to go through an "as applied" analysis
in each individual case. Finally, Part V will offer a summary of the
issues and conclude that, in light of the constitutional protections
at stake, the Supreme Court should either address the issue or the
Seventh Circuit should reconsider its stance.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Evolution of the Ex Post Facto Clause

The Constitution of the United States prohibits Congress and
the states from passing ex post facto laws." Literally translated,
the phrase means "after the fact."12 Yet like many constitutional
provisions, the precise meaning of the Clause is unclear.13 In
Calder v. Bull, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the
Ex Post Facto Clause and identified four categories of laws that
fall within its prohibition.14 Among them are laws that
7. Ortiz, 621 F.3d at 86.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Article I, Section 9 contains a list of
limitations on Congress's powers. Id. Clause 3 reads: "No Bill of Attainder or
ex post facto Law shall be passed." Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1
(prohibiting the states from passing ex post facto laws).
12. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 661
(9th ed. 2009) (defining ex post facto as Latin meaning "from a thing done
afterward," or "[alfter the fact; retroactively").
13. See Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (explaining that the meaning of the
Constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws is unclear standing by itself,
and therefore requires interpretation in order to be a meaningful protection).
14. Id. at 390-91. In his opinion, Justice Chase wrote:
I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and
the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done
before the passing of the law, which was innocent when done, criminal;
and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that
changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony,
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in
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aggravate a crime after it has been committed and laws that
increase the punishment attached to an offense after it has been
committed.15 Central to the Court's opinion in Calder was the
notion that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to serve the
dual purpose of preventing legislatures from enacting arbitrary or
vindictive legislation, as well as providing individuals with fair
notice of the effects of legislative enactments.16
The Supreme Court further elaborated on the Ex Post Facto
7
Clause in Dobbert v. Floridaand Weaver v. Graham.1
In Dobbert,

the Court noted that for a law to implicate the Ex Post Facto
Clause, it must alter "substantial personal rights," not merely
affect procedure.1 8 The statute at issue in that case involved a
order to convict the offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly
unjust and oppressive.

Id.
15. Id. at 390. Of particular importance to this Comment are the second
and third types of laws that Justice Chase identified as violating the Ex Post
Facto Clause, "every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed," and "every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed." Id.
16. Id. at 388-89, 396 (opinion of Paterson, J.), 399-400 (opinion of Iredell,
J.). Accord Miller, 482 U.S. at 429-30 (discussing Calder v. Bull and the dual
purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause to prevent "legislative abuses" and to
provide notice and permit individuals to rely on the effect of legislative
enactments unless they are explicitly changed).
17. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24
(1981). The statute at issue in Weaver related to reduced sentences or "gaintime" for convicted prisoners who exhibit good conduct while they are
imprisoned. Id. at 26. When the petitioner was sentenced in 1976, Florida
Statute § 944.27(1) (1975) was in effect and provided a formula for calculating
deductions from a prisoner's sentence as "gain-time" for good behavior. Id. In
1978, that statute was repealed and replaced with Florida Statute
§ 944.275(1) (1979), which reformulated the "gain-time" deductions. Id. The
newer version of the statute applied to all prisoners, even those sentenced
before its enactment. Id. at 27. The effect was a decrease in the amount of
days of "gain-time" reduction a prisoner could receive, resulting in a longer
sentence for prisoners with good behavior than under the previous statute. Id.
For the petitioner this amounted to a difference of over two years. Id.
18. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293. The statute in effect at the time Dobbert
committed his crimes provided that a person convicted of a capital crime
would automatically receive the death penalty unless a majority of the jury
recommended mercy. Id. at 288 n.3. This statute was struck down as
unconstitutional before Dobbert's trial commenced. Id. at 288. At the time of
his trial, the statute in effect provided that a defendant found guilty of a
capital felony would then proceed to a sentencing hearing. Id. at 290-92. The
jury at the hearing would then consider the relevant information and render
an advisory decision, which the judge could either accept or alter on the basis
of other considerations. Id. at 291. This change in the law was deemed
procedural, as it affected merely the manner in which the death penalty would
be imposed and did not change the amount of punishment attached to the
crime. Id. at 293-94. Accord Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925) (stating
that "the constitutional provision [forbidding the states from passing ex post
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change to the way the death penalty was handed down for capital
offenses.19 The previous statute left the question of whether to
impose the death penalty solely up to the jury, while the revised
statute allowed the jury to recommend the death penalty, but gave
20
In
the judge leeway to deviate from that recommendation.
the
implicated,
not
was
Clause
Facto
finding that the Ex Post
Court focused on the fact that the new law did not alter the
amount of punishment attached to the crime but merely changed
the method for determining whether that punishment would be
imposed. 21
In Weaver, the Court discussed two additional elements that
22
must be present for a law to be an ex post facto law. The Court
stated that the law must be retrospective, applying to events that
occurred prior to its enactment, and it must also work to the
disadvantage of the defendant. 23 The Weaver Court was careful to
point out that although Dobbert indicated that laws that are
merely procedural do not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, a law
that appears to be procedural on its face may still violate the Ex
24
Post Facto Clause if it alters a substantial personal right. Both
cases also reiterated the dual purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause
as a restraint on legislatures as well as a measure for ensuring
that individuals have fair warning as to the effect of legislative
enactments. 25

facto laws] was intended to secure substantial personal rights against
arbitrary and oppressive legislation, see Malloy v. South Carolina,237 U.S.
180, 183 [(1915)], and not to limit the legislative control of remedies and
modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance."). See generally
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565,
590 (1896); Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 386 (1898); Mallett v. North
Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 597 (1901). All of the above cases rejected ex post facto
challenges to laws that were procedural and did not impact or alter
substantial rights.
19. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288-93.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 293-94. "The new statute simply altered the methods employed in
determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no
change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime." Id. This oftencited quote from Dobbert reveals the importance the Court placed on
distinguishing between laws that affect rights, which implicate the Ex Post
Facto Clause, and laws that affect only procedure, which do not.
22. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 29 n.12.
25. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293, 297-98; Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29,
reaffirming Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388-89 (opinion of Chase, J.), 396
(opinion of Paterson, J.), 399-400 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
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B. The Ex Post Facto Clause Applied to Sentencing Guidelines
In Miller v. Florida, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether Florida's sentencing guidelines statute, which
directed sentencing judges to apply the version of the state
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 26 The defendant in Miller had committed sexual
battery and other crimes that, at the time he committed them,
resulted in a sentencing range between three and one-half to four
and one-half years in prison. 27 Under the revised version of the
Guidelines, the sentence range for the crime was increased to
between five and one-half to seven years imprisonment. 28 The
Court applied a three-part test derived from prior case law and
found that the statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 29
The Court considered: (1) whether the statute was
retrospective; (2) whether it disadvantaged the criminal
defendant; and (3) whether it altered "substantial personal rights"
or only "modes of procedure which do not affect matters of
substance."30 In striking down the statute, the Court noted that it
was retrospective in nature because it altered the legal
consequences for a crime committed before the statute's
enactment.3 1 The statute was also disadvantageous to the
defendant because it resulted in a longer sentence than the
sentence imposed under the previous Guidelines, and also because
this sentence was presumed reasonable since it fell within the

26. Miller, 482 U.S. at 424-26. The statute at issue in Miller permitted the
sentencing judge to apply the version of the Guidelines in effect at the time of
sentencing, as opposed to the Guidelines in effect at the time the crime was
committed. Id. Points were assigned to the offender on the basis of his crime
and other factors, for example his prior record, legal status at the time of the
offense, and the injuries sustained by the victim. Id. at 426. The statute then
provided a sentencing range corresponding to the total points score. Id. A
sentence within the range was presumed reasonable; the judge did not have to
provide a written explanation for sentencing within the range and his decision
was not reviewable on appeal. Id. Further, if the sentencing judge departed
from the recommended sentencing range, he was required to provide clear and
convincing reasons for doing so. Id. The defendant in Miller committed sexual
battery and other crimes that, at the time he committed them, subjected him
to a range of between three and one-half to four and one-half years
imprisonment. Id. at 424. Yet, at the time of his sentencing, a revised version
of the state Guidelines had gone into effect, which increased the points for his
sexual battery offense and resulted in a sentencing range of five and one-half
to seven years imprisonment. Id. The sentencing judge applied the upwardly
revised Guidelines and the defendant was sentenced to a term of seven years
imprisonment. Id. at 428.
27. Id. at 424.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 430.
30. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293; Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
31. Miller, 482 U.S. at 430-31; Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31.
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new, albeit longer, Guidelines range. 32
Finally, in addressing whether the sentencing guidelines
statute altered personal rights or merely procedure, the Court took
into account some additional factors. 33 The Court noted that the
sentencing law was an enactment by the legislature carrying the
full "force and effect of law." 34 Thus, the Court held that the
Guidelines were not "flexible guideposts" to assist the sentencing
judge, but instead were "high hurdle[s] that must be cleared before
discretion can be exercised."35 The resulting direct, adverse effect
on the defendant's sentence affected his personal rights and,
therefore, caused an Ex Post Facto violation.3 6
The Circuit Courts of Appeals then extended the Miller
holding to apply to federal sentencing Guidelines, noting the
similarity between the federal Guidelines and the state Guidelines
at issue in Miller.37 Oftentimes, this resulted in the application of
an older version of the Guidelines to avoid ex post facto
32. Miller, 482 U.S. at 431-33; Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
33. Miller, 482 U.S. at 435.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. The Court distinguished the current statute from the statute at
issue in Dobbert, noting that "this is not a case where we can conclude, as we
did in Dobbert, that 'the crime for which the present defendant was indicted,
the punishment prescribed therefor, and the quantity or the degree of proof
necessary to establish his guilt, all remained unaffected by the subsequent
statute."' Id. (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 294). The characteristics noted by
the Court in Dobbert are indicative of a statute that merely affects procedure
and therefore does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 433.
37. Christine M. Zeivel, Comment, Ex-Post-Booker: Retroactive Application
of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 395, 405 (2008). See
United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216, 218 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases
from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals, which have held
that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the retroactive application of federal
sentencing guidelines that disadvantage a criminal defendant and noting that
the Seventh Circuit had yet to adopt that holding). See also United States v.
Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1042 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the application
of revised Guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when the defendant is
subjected to a more severe sentence under the Guidelines in effect at the time
he is sentenced than he would have been subject to at the time he committed
the crime); United States v. Young, 932 F.2d 1035, 1038 n.3 (2d Cir. 1991)
(same); United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Morrow, 925 F.2d 779, 782-83 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); United States
v. Suarez, 911 F.2d 1016, 1021-22 (5th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v.
Nagi, 947 F.2d 211, 213 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2309 (1992)
(same); United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1384-86 (7th Cir. 1994) (same);
United States v. Swanger, 919 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (same);
United States v. Sweeten, 933 F.2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1452 n.3 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 225 (1991) (same); United States v. Worthy, 915 F.2d 1514, 1516 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 304-05
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (same).
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problems.38 The issue seemed to be settled until the
Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Booker that the
Guidelines were no longer mandatory but instead served an
advisory purpose. 39
C. United States v. Booker Upsets an Established System
In Booker, the Supreme Court ruled on the application of the
Sixth Amendment to the Guidelines. 40 The issue in Booker was
whether the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury was violated
when an enhanced sentence was imposed under the Guidelines
based solely upon the judge's own findings of fact (as opposed to
findings by the jury or admissions of the defendant). 4' The

38. See, e.g., Seacott, 15 F.3d at 1386 (explaining that the holding in Miller
applies to the federal Guidelines and joining "all of our sister circuits" in
holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of upwardly
revised Guidelines).
39. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. The issue in Booker was whether the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury prevented a sentencing judge from making
independent factual findings that resulted in an increased sentencing range.
Id. The Supreme Court held that this constituted a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury. Id.
Booker was a consolidated case involving two respondents. Id. at 226.
The first respondent was found guilty of violating a federal statute that
prohibited possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Id. at 227. The
Guidelines prescribed a range of between two hundred and ten and two
hundred and sixty-two months. Id. The judge actually imposed a sentence of
three hundred and sixty months, which was almost ten years longer than the
Guidelines range. Id. This sentence was based upon the judge's independent
factual finding that the defendant had possessed more cocaine than the jury
found that he had. Id. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit struck down the
increased sentence as inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment and prior
Supreme Court precedent. Id.
The Court addressed a similar question in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), in the context of a state statute. The Apprendi Court held that
the Sixth Amendment requires that "[any fact (other than a prior conviction),
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized
by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Booker, 543
U.S. at 244 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). In Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004), a case following Apprendi, the Supreme Court again
addressed the issue of the Sixth Amendment in relation to a state criminal
statute, and reaffirmed its previous holding. Id. at 303-04. The Court held
once again that the right to trial by jury means that any fact that "increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 301
(quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). Each of these cases involved state
Guidelines, so Booker was the first opportunity for the Supreme Court to
extend its holdings to the federal Guidelines. The Court in Booker noted that
there was no significant difference between the procedures at issue in these
cases and the federal Guidelines. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226.
41. Id. at 229 n.1.
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Supreme Court held that the mandatory Guidelines violated the
Sixth Amendment because they required judges to impose
sentences within the Guidelines range unless "the court" made
additional findings of fact to justify a different sentence. 42
In light of this holding, the Court was then faced with the
question of how to reconcile it with the Guidelines. 43 The Court
noted that the Sixth Amendment would not be implicated if the
Guidelines were not binding on the courts.44 The Court then looked
to congressional intent and decided that, rather than strike the
Guidelines in their entirety, the proper remedy was to sever and
excise those portions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the
Guidelines mandatory. 45 The effect of the Court's decision in
42. Id. at 233-34 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 245. The Court addressed two options in light of its initial
holding. Id. at 246. The Court could either interpret the Sentencing Reform
Act as it stood to require that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt any fact
that would increase a defendant's sentence beyond the recommended range, or
it could eliminate those portions of the Act that made the Guidelines
mandatory. Id. The Court sought to be consistent with Congress's intent in
enacting the Sentencing Reform Act and creating the Guidelines. Id. at 24647. It noted that Congress's main goal was to ensure uniformity in sentencing,
and that Congress would not have intended to make it easier for judges to
adjust sentences downward rather than upward. Id. at 255-57. In light of
these concerns, the Court found that Congress intended to create a sentencing
system that would enable judges to consider additional facts, not found by the
jury, which would impact the defendant's sentence. Id. at 257-58.
44. Id. at 233. "If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as
merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the
selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment." Id.
45. Id. at 245-46. Of great importance to this Comment is the Court's
holding that, "the provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the
Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), [is] incompatible with [the
Court's] constitutional holding" that "the Sixth Amendment requires juries,
not judges, to find facts relevant to sentencing." Id. at 245. The Court decided
to sever and excise this section, as well as 18 U.S.C.S. § 3742(e), which was
dependent on the Guidelines being mandatory. Id.
The excised portion of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(1) read as
follows:
(b) Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence.
(1) In general.
Except as provided in paragraph (2), the court shall impose a sentence of
the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result
in a sentence different from that described. In determining whether a
circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall
consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official
commentary of the Sentencing Commission. In the absence of an
applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall impose an appropriate
sentence, having due regard for the purposes set forth in subsection
(a)(2). In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline in the case of
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Booker was to render the Guidelines advisory only. 46 As a result of
the Booker ruling, a sentencing judge now is only required to
consider the Guidelines range, yet has leeway to take into account
other factors and alter the sentence on that basis. 47
D. The CurrentDebate
In the wake of Booker, the ex post facto issue surrounding
sentencing guidelines has reemerged. 48 Now that the Guidelines
are no longer binding law, courts must consider whether they
implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause and whether the Clause is
violated when sentencing judges apply upwardly revised versions
of the Guidelines.49 The Supreme Court has yet to address this
question, and the Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on the
issue.50
III. ANALYSIS
Prior to the Booker decision, the Circuit Courts of Appeals
uniformly held that the application of increased sentencing
Guidelines violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, yet the holding in
Booker raised the issue anew.5 1 The Seventh Circuit was the first

an offense other than a petty offense, the court shall also have due
regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to sentences
prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar offenses and offenders,
and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(1) (1984) (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which called for a de novo standard of review for
sentences deviating from the mandatory Guidelines, was also stricken. Booker,
543 U.S. at 259. The Court determined that without the mandatory provisions,
the statute was still capable of functioning independently, was constitutional,
and was in line with Congress's intent. Id. at 258-59.
46. Id. at 245-46. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) requires a court to consider the
Guidelines range, yet allows the court to tailor the sentence in light of other
statutory concerns. Id.
47. Id. at 233. The Sixth Amendment problem was thus eliminated because
a defendant does not have a right to a jury determination of a sentence within
the judge's discretion. Id.
48. See Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795 (holding that the advisory Guidelines no
longer implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause). But see Turner, 548 F.3d at 1100
(rejecting Demaree and arguing that the Ex Post Facto Clause is still
implicated, even in light of Booker, and proceeding with an "as applied"
analysis).
49. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795; Turner, 548 F.3d at 1100.
50. See Ortiz, 621 F.3d at 86-87 (noting the circuit split).
51. See Schnell, 982 F.2d at 218 (noting agreement among all the Circuit
Courts of Appeals that the holding in Miller (that increased Guidelines could
not be applied to defendants who committed their crimes when a less severe
version of those Guidelines was in effect) also applied to the federal
Guidelines). But see Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794 (indicating that, since Booker
made the Guidelines advisory, the Miller line of reasoning is no longer
applicable).
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to address the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause in light of
the advisory Guidelines in Demaree, which represented a shift
from its pre-Booker holdings. 52 However, no other circuit has
endorsed this approach. In Turner, the D.C. Circuit explicitly
rejected the holding in Demaree and held that the Ex Post Facto
Clause was implicated, even under the advisory Guidelines. 58
Since then, three other circuits have followed suit.54 Although the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Demaree has been criticized and has
yet to be followed by any other Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Seventh Circuit continues to stand by its decision.5 5
A. The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Demaree Adopts a
FacialApproach and Holds That, as a Matter of Law, the Ex Post
Facto Clause Is Not Implicated Under the Advisory Guidelines
The Seventh Circuit was the first to address the question of
whether, in light of the now-advisory Guidelines, a change in the
Guidelines that increased the punishment for a crime after it had
been committed violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.56 This time, the
court distinguished Miller as applicable only to mandatory
Guidelines. 5 7 The court held that since the Ex Post Facto Clause
applies only to binding regulations, the Clause is not implicated
under the advisory Guidelines.58
The court rejected a literal interpretation of an ex post facto
law as any regulation that disadvantages the defendant or poses a

52. See generally Demaree, 459 F.3d 791.
53. See generally Turner, 548 F.3d 1094.
54. United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2010); Ortiz, 621 F.3d at
87.
55. See United States v. Favara, 615 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2010)
(addressing an ex post facto challenge to a sentence under the advisory
Guidelines and following the holding in Demaree that the use of the advisory
Guidelines does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v.
Robertson, 662 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v.
Sandoval, 668 F.3d 865, 870 (7th Cir. 2011) (same).
56. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 792.
57. Id. at 794. The Seventh Circuit in Demaree described both the state
statute at issue in Miller and the mandatory federal Guidelines as
"constraining," arguing that they afforded judges only limited opportunities to
depart from the prescribed sentencing range. Id. The court went on to describe
and distinguish the advisory Guidelines. See also Daniel M. Levy, Comment,
Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack of Control Over the
Federal Sentencing GuidelinesAfter Booker, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 265051 (2009) (stating "[t]he Seventh Circuit distinguished the post-Booker
Sentencing Guidelines from those at issue in Miller by pointing out that, in
Miller, the sentencing judge had to set forth clear and convincing evidence to
depart from the presumptive guideline range.").
58. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795. "We conclude that the [Eix [P]ost [F]acto
[C]lause should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than
advise. . . ." Id.
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risk of increased punishment.5 9 Emphasis was placed on the fact
that under the advisory Guidelines, a judge is not required to
sentence within the recommended range.60 While a judge must
consider the Guidelines range, she can also sentence according to
other factors.6 1
The Demaree court also expressed concern that a rule
prohibiting retroactive application of enhanced Guidelines would
have only a "semantic effect." 62 According to the court, this is
because a sentencing judge could simply avoid the rule by stating
that she started with the older version of the Guidelines but
increased the sentence on the basis of other factors listed in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 63
B. The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Turner Rejects the Facial
Approach Applied in Demaree and Adopts a "SubstantialRisk"
Standard

In Turner, the D.C. Circuit faced a similar ex post facto
challenge to the application of revised Guidelines that increased
59. Id. at 794. The court expressed the concern that, if these requirements
were liberally applied to any form of regulation (as opposed to just binding
laws), it would open the door to many potential ex post facto claims. Id. The
court cited the examples of a Congressional joint resolution urging judges to
hand down lengthier sentences, or a practice of appointing judges who pledged
to be heavy handed in regards to criminal sentencing. Id. Although both of
these instances would tend to make sentences longer, it cannot and should not
be said that either one violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
60. Id. at 795. The court likened the Guidelines to a nudge, pushing the
judge towards the sentencing range but allowing him "unfettered" freedom to
impose a reasonable sentence outside the range. Id.
61. Id. The Sentencing Reform Act, as modified by the Booker decision, no
longer requires sentencing judges to sentence within the range offered by the
Guidelines. Id. A sentencing judge is still required to take into account the
range, according to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. However, the judge may sentence
on the basis of a variety of other factors that are also enumerated in the
statute. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (listing seven considerations that
courts are required to take into account in determining what sentence to
impose).
62. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795.
63. Id. The court stated that the Sentencing Commission is expert in
criminal punishments and when the Commission changes a guideline, it does
so on the basis of factors it has deemed important. Id. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that the same factors that were important to the
Sentencing Commission in increasing the sentencing range for a crime would
also be important for a sentencing judge to take into account in determining
an individual sentence. Id. The effect on the sentence would be the same
whether the judge started with the earlier Guidelines and took the additional
factors into account, or sentenced under the latter Guidelines with the factors
already accounted for. Id. However, the Seventh Circuit's suggestion that a
sentencing judge would purport to base his decision on an earlier version of
the Guidelines while in fact sentencing under a later version has been highly
criticized.
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the sentencing range for the crime committed by the defendant.64
The D.C. Circuit rejected the facial analysis conducted in Demaree
and instead held that the proper approach to determine whether
the Ex Post Facto Clause is violated is to conduct an "as applied"
constitutional analysis.65 As applied to the facts at hand, the court
found that the newer Guidelines created a "substantial risk" that
the defendant's sentence would be more severe, and therefore the
sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.66
The court rejected the argument advanced in Demaree that
judges will attempt to avoid a rule prohibiting retroactive
application of enhanced Guidelines by "misrepresent[ing] the true
basis for their actions."6 7 The court also noted that judges are
highly likely to sentence within the Guidelines, especially since
the Supreme Court's decision in Rita v. United States held that
sentences within the Guidelines range are presumed reasonable. 68
Finally, the Turner court emphasized the importance of the
Guidelines as a "starting point or 'anchor' for judges," and noted
that they will be taken more seriously than Demaree suggests.69
In the case of United States v. Lewis, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the D.C. Circuit's approach in holding that the retroactive
application of increased Guidelines implicates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 70 The court held that the Guidelines are a crucial "starting
point" and "initial benchmark" for the sentencing process, and
therefore "an increased advisory Guidelines range poses a
significant risk that a defendant will be subject to increased
punishment."7 1 This holding was reaffirmed in United States v.
Knight, where the court once again followed the rule that the
application of "post-offense" Guidelines that result in an increased

64. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1096. The defendant in Turner was convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the United States. Id. He committed the crime in 2001,
when the base level for the offense was ten and the Guidelines range was
twenty-one to twenty-seven months imprisonment. Id. However, the
Guidelines were amended in 2004 to a base level of fourteen and a resulting
Guidelines range of thirty-three to forty-one months imprisonment. Id. The
defendant was sentenced to thirty-three months in 2006 under the revised
Guidelines. Id.
65. Id. at 1100.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1099.
68. Id.; Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
69. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099.
70. Lewis, 606 F.3d at 199. In Lewis, the applicable Guidelines range at the
time the defendant was sentenced was nearly double that of the Guidelines
range in effect at the time he committed the offense. Id. at 195. The lower
court declined to sentence according to the increased Guidelines after finding
that doing so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. The Fourth Circuit
agreed. Id.
71. Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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sentencing range violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.72
The Second Circuit in United States v. Ortiz also adopted the
"substantial risk" approach to determining whether the Ex Post
Facto Clause is violated by the application of increased
Guidelines.73 That court rejected the hard line test adopted in
Demaree.7 4 It noted that the "substantial risk" standard is more
appropriate because, though it does not invalidate every increased
sentence imposed under the Guidelines, it allows the court to
consider the circumstances in each individual case to determine
whether the Ex Post Facto Clause has been violated. 7
Most recently, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the circuit split
in United States v. Wetherald, and found the D.C. Circuit's
reasoning to be more compelling.76 The court noted that as a
practical matter, the Guidelines, though not mandatory, are the
starting point for sentencing judges.77 Once the judge has correctly
calculated the Guidelines range, it is difficult for a defendant to
show that a within-Guidelines sentence is unreasonable.78
Because of the importance the Guidelines play in sentencing, the
court stated, "it cannot be said that the Ex Post Facto Clause is
never implicated when a more recent, harsher, set of Guidelines is
employed."79 Following the D.C. Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held
that the proper way to approach ex post facto challenges is to
conduct an "as applied" analysis to determine whether the change
in Guidelines created a "sufficient risk" of increased punishment
in each individual case.80
C. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals Have Discussed the Split, but
Have Not Explicitly Ruled on the Issue
1. Though not expressly adoptingthe approach taken by the D.C.
Circuit in Turner, the First and Sixth Circuits have indicated a
preference for the "asapplied"approach.
The First Circuit in United States v. Gilman stated that
although the Seventh Circuit held that the Ex Post Facto Clause is
72. United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010). "This
court . .. has recently rejected the Demaree analysis and reaffirmed our preBooker view that application of a post-offense Guidelines Manual that
increases the advisory sentencing range violates the Ex Post Facto clause." Id.
The court noted that the question was settled in the Fourth Circuit after
Lewis. Id.
73. Ortiz, 621 F.3d at 87.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
77. Id. at 1321.
78. Id. at 1322.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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no longer implicated by increased Guidelines in light of Booker and
the change from mandatory to advisory Guidelines, "the issue is
doubtful in this circuit."8 1Although not explicitly taking a stance,
the court went on to conduct an "as applied" analysis and upheld
the defendant's sentence under the revised Guidelines. 82 The court
found that the policy considerations underlying the increased
Guidelines justified the higher sentence, and therefore there was
no ex post facto violation. 83
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Barton initially seemed
to indicate that a change to the Guidelines would not raise ex post
facto concerns. 84 However, in United States v. Duane the court
went back on this implication, declining "to read Barton as
announcing such a broad rule." 85 Though the court in Duane did
not expressly adopt a position on the ex post facto question, it went
on to conduct an "as applied" analysis.86 The court focused on the
fact that the defendant was on notice that he could be sentenced
according to a more stringent version of the Guidelines and
therefore his sentence under the revised Guidelines did not violate
87
the Ex Post Facto Clause.

81. United States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 449 (1st Cir. 2007).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. United States v. Barton, 455 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2006). The court in
Barton discussed the distinction between retroactive application of advisory
Guidelines as opposed to mandatory Guidelines. Id. at 655 n.4. The court
noted that, whereas increased mandatory Guidelines operate as laws and
therefore directly implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, advisory Guidelines do
not. Id. The court stated that the advisory Guidelines "are no longer akin to
statutes in their authoritativeness" and "[a]s such, the Ex Post Facto Clause is
not implicated." Id.
85. United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2008). The court in
Duane distinguished Barton as dealing with the retroactive application of the
Booker decision itself, rather than the retroactive application of the
Guidelines. Id. In Barton, the defendant pleaded guilty before the Booker
decision came down, but was sentenced after Booker. Barton, 455 F.3d at 652.
He argued that the application of the negative aspects of the Booker decision,
which allowed his sentencing range to be increased, violated the Due Process
Clause. Id. The discussion of the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause in
Barton can therefore be categorized as dicta.
86. Duane, 533 F.3d at 447. The court first noted that the question of
whether the Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated by a change to the Guidelines
that increases the sentencing range for an offense had not been addressed in
the Sixth Circuit in light of Booker. Id. at 445. It went on to discuss the split of
authority between the Seventh Circuit and other circuits weighing in on the
issue, noting that despite the Seventh Circuit holding that the Ex Post Facto
Clause is not implicated, many courts continue to go through an "as applied"
analysis. Id. at 446 n.1. The court then assumed "arguendothat a retroactive
change to the Guidelines could implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause," and went
on to conduct an "as applied" analysis. Id. at 447.
87. Id. at 449.
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2. The Fifth Circuit,on the other hand, has indicateda preference
for the facial approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in
Demaree.
Although the Fifth Circuit has not determined whether the
Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated after the Booker decision
rendered the Guidelines advisory, that court seems to be leaning
towards the Seventh Circuit's interpretation.88 In a concurring
opinion in United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, Chief Judge Edith
Jones stated that she found the reasoning in Demaree persuasive
on the issue.89 She argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause would not
be offended by the application of revised Guidelines for two
reasons.90 First was the fact that advisory regulations do not pose
the same ex post facto problems that mandatory regulations do
because they are merely informative, not binding laws.91 Second
was the consideration that a sentence imposed even after
considering revised advisory Guidelines may not be any harsher
than it would have been under previous Guidelines. 92 Although the
defendants' sentences were found to violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause in that case, the court based this finding on the fact that
the sentences were handed down prior to Booker.93
In United States v. Castillo-Estevez, the Fifth Circuit again
88. See Levy, supra note 57, at 2651 ("In United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez,
the Fifth Circuit indicated that it might agree with the Seventh Circuit in
future cases where the defendant committed the offense after Booker.").
89. United States v. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2007)
(Jones, C.J., concurring). This case indicated another way in which the Ex Post
Facto Clause may come into play when a sentencing judge applies a revised
version of the Guidelines. Many of the other cases discussed in this Comment
have dealt with ex post facto challenges to Guidelines that have been revised
to increase the base level of the offense and therefore increase the sentencing
range for the offense. In Rodarte-Vasquez, however, the ex post facto challenge
dealt with the wording of the Guidelines revision. Id. at 323. The defendants
both plead guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. Id. at 318. In
determining their sentences, the judge considered past convictions for
transporting and harboring illegal aliens. Id. Under the version of the
Guidelines in effect when they committed the crime of illegal reentry, a
sentencing enhancement applied only if the prior offenses were committed for
profit. Id. at 319, Under the revised Guidelines in effect at the time they were
sentenced, the sentencing enhancement applied regardless of whether the
prior offenses were committed for profit or not. Id. Therefore, the defendants
alleged an ex post facto violation based on the language of the Guidelines,
arguing that they did not commit their prior crimes for profit and so would not
be subject to the enhancement under the prior version of the Guidelines. Id. at
323.
90. Id. at 325. "A logical corollary to Booker would seem to be that the [E]x
[P]ost[F]acto Clause does not apply. . . ." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. "[A]s this case arises from a pre-Booker sentencing, we do not reach
the issue whether the [E]x [Plost [Facto Clause can apply to a post-Booker
sentence." Id.
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addressed an ex post facto challenge to the application of revised
Guidelines. 94 The court stated that the defendant's ex post facto
argument overlooked Booker, and discussed the concurring opinion
in Rodarte-Vasquez with seeming approval.9 5 However, since the
court was reviewing the defendant's sentence under a plain error
standard of review, it was not required to and did not adopt a rule
for determining whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to the
advisory Guidelines.96

3. Other Circuit Courts of Appeals have discussed the split of
authority, but have not indicated which line of reasoning,if
any, they would follow.
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Deegan addressed the
application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the advisory Guidelines
after the defendant claimed the lower court erred by discussing
the higher Guidelines range.97 Although the lower court ultimately
followed the rule that the application of upwardly revised
Guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court of Appeals
noted that, in light of Booker, "the endurance of that rule is an
open question in this circuit."9 8
In United States v. Jones, the Tenth Circuit only briefly
touched on the Ex Post Facto question.99 That court stated that,
although the defendant was sentenced according to the Guidelines
in effect when he committed the crime, "we offer no opinion as to
whether the now-advisory guidelines require an ex post facto
analysis."10 0 In United States v. Yip, the Ninth Circuit also
recognized the split of authority over whether the Ex Post Facto

94. United States v. Castillo-Estevez, 597 F.3d 238, 240-41 (5th Cir. 2010).
95. Id. at 241. After discussing the main points from the concurring opinion
in Rodarte-Vasquez, the court stated that this was consistent with the
approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Demaree that the Ex Post Facto
Clause applies "only to laws and regulations that bind rather than advise." Id.
(quoting Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794). The court mentioned contrary decisions
from the D.C. Circuit and the Eighth Circuit, but did not discuss these
holdings to the same degree. Id.
96. Castillo-Estevez, 597 F.3d at 241.
97. United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 2010). Although the
court ended up applying the version of the Guidelines in effect when the
defendant committed her crime, in its decision the court discussed and
considered the version in effect at the time of sentencing. Id. at 632. The
defendant did not make a timely objection, so the standard of review on appeal
was for plain error. Id. For these reasons, the court was not forced to
definitively decide the issue. Id.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Jones, 254 F. App'x 711 (10th Cir. 2007). In a footnote
the court cited cases demonstrating the conflicting holdings on the application
of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the advisory Guidelines. Id. at 730 n.10.
100. Id. at 730.
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Clause is implicated under the advisory Guidelines.1 0 1 However, in
that case, the court was not called upon to decide the issue and
declined to further address it.102 As of the date of publication of
this Comment, the Third Circuit is the only circuit that has not
discussed or addressed the issue.
IV.

PROPOSAL

The precise meaning and application of the Ex Post Facto
Clause has challenged courts since the Constitution was
enacted, 103 and the current circuit split is but another example of
the challenges inherent in applying constitutional guarantees to
novel and ever changing scenarios. This section will discuss the
application of prior Supreme Court precedent to the current
issue. 104 It will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the
arguments that the Courts of Appeals have adopted both for and
against the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to sentences
under the advisory Guidelines.105 Finally, it will conclude that, in
light of these considerations, the solution is to conduct an "as
applied" analysis. 106
While past precedent helps to put the issues in context, it
does little to resolve the split because there are strong arguments
for both sides. In Calder,an early Supreme Court case defining the
meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court identified laws
that make the punishment for a crime more severe than when it
was committed as violating the Clause.107 On one hand, the
advisory Guidelines are not laws in a literal sense, and do not

101. United States v. Yip, 362 F. App'x 659, 662 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). In a
footnote, the court noted the disagreement and cited Demaree and Turner as
authorities coming down on opposite sides of the issue. Id.
102. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Yip held that the lower court erred by
sentencing the defendant under a revised version of the Guidelines as opposed
to the ones in effect at the time the crimes were committed. Id. at 662.
Although this appears to be in keeping with the Turner line of reasoning, the
court was really just following its own pre-Booker precedent. Id. The court
noted that it was not called upon by either party to decide whether Booker was
irreconcilable with prior holdings, but seemed to indicate that it would have
considered the issue anew if asked to do so. Id. at 662 n.2.
103. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388-89 (opinion of Chase, J.); Dobbert, 432
U.S. at 293, 297-98; Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29.
104. In particular, it will incorporate the cases discussed in the
"Background" section of this Comment and their application to the issue at
hand.
105. The focus will be on the arguments advanced in Demaree, 459 F.3d 791,
and Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, as those courts were the first to take a stand on
the application of the Ex Post Facto Clause to the Guidelines post-Booker, and
came down on opposite sides of the issue.
106. Similar to the analysis adopted by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Turner, 548 F.3d at 1094.
107. Calder,3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390.
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necessarily lead to increased punishment.10 8 On the other hand,
the Guidelines are still a starting point for sentencing judges and
oftentimes proscribe a higher sentencing range than the one in
effect at the time the crime was committed. 09
In Dobbert, the Court noted that whether the Ex Post Facto
Clause was implicated also depended on whether the change in
law affected substantive personal rights or merely procedure.1 10 In
fact, the Court in that case distinguished between a law that
affects the amount of punishment and one that affects only the
method for determining punishment.111 The Court held that the
former implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause, whereas the latter
does not.112 While a sentence under an increased Guidelines range
clearly affects the amount of punishment a criminal receives,
rendering the Guidelines advisory but not striking them in their
entirety arguably impacts only the method for determining
punishment.
The Court added to Ex Post Facto Clause precedent in
Weaver, where it held that a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
if it is both retrospective in nature and disadvantageous to the
offender. 113 Although changes to the Guidelines apply to some
extent to events occurring before the changes were enacted, the
ability of a judge to depart from the Guidelines muddles the
analysis. 114 Furthermore, application of revised Guidelines may be

108. The Demaree court expressed concern with extending the Ex Post Facto
Clause to anything other than "laws and regulations that bind rather than
advise." Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795. The court noted that, if the Clause was not
so limited, it could be extended to apply to "any regulation traceable to
Congress that disadvantages a criminal defendant." Id. at 794.
The ability of sentencing judges to depart from the Guidelines range is
the main reason why, even when Guidelines have been upwardly revised, they
may not actually result in an increased sentence. However, as has been noted,
most sentences do in fact fall within the advisory Guidelines range. Id.;
Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099.
109. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099. As the court in Turner noted, sentencing
judges are required to begin by calculating the Guidelines range in effect at
the time of sentencing and will often sentence within that calculated range. Id.
For the defendant in Turner, the Guidelines in effect at the time he was
sentenced proscribed a higher sentence than the ones in effect at the time he
committed his crimes, and he was in fact sentenced according to the higher
range.
110. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293.
111. Id. at 293-94.
112. Id.
113. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29.
114. As Miller held, the application of increased Guidelines clearly was
retrospective in that the revised Guidelines applied to crimes committed
before they were enacted. Miller, 482 U.S. at 430-31. Now that the Guidelines
are no longer mandatory and judges have the ability to deviate on the basis of
other factors and policy considerations, it is less clear whether they are
retrospective in nature.
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disadvantageous in some cases, but is not necessarily so." 5
Another important consideration throughout the case law has
been the purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause as a mechanism for
ensuring that people are on notice as to potential penalties for
their actions. 116 Courts have held that notice that a sentence may
be changed is not sufficient.11 7 Yet at the same time, notice does
not require that a defendant be able to determine to a degree of
certainty the punishment that he may be subject to.118 As the court

in Demaree noted, even under the mandatory Guidelines this
would have been extremely difficult.1 19 Since prior case law can be
read to support both positions, it does relatively little to resolve
the current dispute.
As for the cases specifically addressing the Ex Post Facto
Clause in relation to the advisory Guidelines, much emphasis has
been placed on the fact that by their plain wording, the Guidelines
are not binding laws.120 After the Guidelines were rendered
advisory in Booker, some courts have argued that the Ex Post
Facto Clause is simply not implicated by anything other than
"laws."121 However, this argument ignores Supreme Court cases
that have rejected such a simple analysis as to when the Ex Post
Facto Clause is implicated.122
In practical effect, describing the Guidelines as merely
advisory is an understatement. Sentencing judges are required to
calculate the Guidelines range-they at least represent a starting

115. Once again, because the Guidelines are a starting point and sentencing
judges have the ability to depart from the recommended range, there is no
guarantee that defendants will be subject to increased sentences. However,
this is not to say that they are not, in some cases, subject to a "substantial
risk" of increased punishment. Turner,548 F.3d at 1100.
116. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388-89 (opinion of Chase, J.), 396 (opinion of
Paterson, J.), 399-400 (opinion of Iredell, J.); Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 297-98;
Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29.
117. Miller, 482 U.S. at 431. "The constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws cannot be avoided merely by adding to a law notice that it might be
changed." Id.
118. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293-94; Demaree, 459 F.3d at 793.
119. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 793.
120. This was the force of the reasoning underlying the holding in Demaree.
Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795. Similarly, the concurring opinion in RodarteVasquez noted that "purely advisory regulation[s]" do not implicate the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d at 325 (Jones, E., concurring).
121. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795; Rodarte-Vasquez, 488 F.3d at 325 (Jones, E.,
concurring).
122. See James R. Dillon, Comment, Doubting Demaree: The Application of
Ex Post Facto Principles to the United States Sentencing Guidelines After
United States v. Booker, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2008) (arguing that
the Court has "rejected bright-line classifications of 'law' or 'not law' for
evaluating the Ex Post Facto Clause's applicability to a given legislative
enactment. . . .").
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point in the sentencing process. 123 Although judges are no longer
required to sentence within the range, they must justify
significant departures from it.124 The fact that sentences within
the range are presumed reasonable further encourages judges to
sentence within the range. 125 Therefore, when sentences are
reviewed on appeal they are much more likely to be affirmed if
they are within the Guidelines range. 126
Although the Demaree court likened the advisory Guidelines
to a "nudge" towards the appropriate sentence, the court itself
acknowledged that, even after Booker, the majority of federal
sentences continue to be within the Guidelines range. 127 This fact
in itself indicates that the Guidelines are much more than a
"nudge" and are more akin to an "anchor" for sentencing judges.128
Further, the statements in Demaree that a judge's choice of
sentence is only subject to "light appellate review" and that a
judge has "unfettered" freedom to sentence outside the Guidelines
range are noticeable understatements.1 29 As the court in Turner
emphasized, the presumption of reasonableness given to withinGuidelines sentences on appeal means that more judges are likely
to sentence within the Guidelines.1 30
Finally, like the Turner court pointed out, Demaree's
argument that a rule requiring judges to sentence under the older
Guidelines would have only a semantic effect is unpersuasive.131 It
seems that the Demaree court was trying to emphasize that a
judge, in imposing a higher sentence, would probably take into
account the same policy considerations that the sentencing
commission took into account in ratcheting up the Guidelines, yet
the Demaree court actually implied that sentencing judges would
misrepresent the basis for their decisions.132 This is an argument

123. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007); Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099.
124. Lewis, 606 F.3d at 201; Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. As the Court in Gall noted,
although a sentencing judge has the ability to sentence outside the Guidelines,
he must have a "significant justification" for "major departures." Id.
125. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099; Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
126. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099; Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
127. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794. See also Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099 (noting
that the impact of Booker on sentencing has been minor, since most sentences
continue to fall within the Guidelines range).
128. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 794. See also Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099 (referring
to the Guidelines as an "anchor" for judges-an important starting point that
is likely to influence the sentence they impose).
129. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795.
130. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1099.
131. Id. at 1099; Demaree,459 F.3d at 795.
132. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795. The Demaree court noted that under the
advisory Guidelines, a sentencing judge may also take into account the factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. A logical inference is that the Sentencing
Commission is also influenced by these same factors in determining the
applicable sentencing range for a crime. Demaree argued, however, that if a
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with little merit, as it baselessly calls into question the integrity of
the judges themselves.
As more and more courts are confronted with this issue, the
weight of authority and reasoning leans towards the Turner
approach.133 Even courts that do not explicitly adopt that holding
have gone through an "as applied" analysis.134 This is not to
suggest that the Ex Post Facto Clause will always be, or even will
frequently be violated by the application of increased Guidelines.
Courts on both sides of the issue have agreed that increased
sentences are justified in light of other policy considerations.1 35
Also, since the standard of review on appeal is for abuse of
discretion, the likelihood that a significant number of sentences
will be overturned is slight.136 For these reasons, courts should
presume that a within-Guidelines sentence, whether those
Guidelines have been upwardly revised or not, is reasonable. Yet
the inquiry should not stop there, as courts should go through the
facts on a case-by-case basis in order to ensure that each
individual sentence does not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause.
V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, Demaree's arguments for a hard-line rule are simply
not convincing. Yet on the opposite extreme, considerations of past
precedent indicate that in light of the advisory nature of the
Guidelines, it is no longer the case that retroactive application of
increased Guidelines automatically violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Therefore, a more moderate approach similar to the one
adopted by the D.C. Circuit in Turner is the best way to address
future ex post facto challenges to sentences under upwardly
hard-line rule was enacted forbidding judges from sentencing according to
upwardly revised Guidelines, judges would circumvent this rule by saying
they were sentencing under the older Guidelines, but that the § 3553(a)
factors led to the higher sentence. Id. While such a rule would presumably
permit judges to increase sentences on the basis of those enumerated factors,
it is not a logical inference to assume that sentencing judges would not follow
such a rule, if enacted, or that they would go so far as to conceal the true
factors behind their sentences.
133. Turner, 548 F.3d at 1100; Lewis, 606 F.3d at 199; Knight, 606 F.3d at
178; Ortiz, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *13.
134. See Gilman, 478 F.3d at 449 (declining to adopt the "substantial risk"
approach advocated by the D.C. Circuit in Turner, but nonetheless going on to
conduct an "as applied" analysis); Duane, 533 F.3d at 447 (same). Although
these cases declined to explicitly adopt the Turner approach, the fact that they
conducted "as applied" analyses acknowledges that the Ex Post Facto Clause
may be violated by the advisory Guidelines and that they would not follow
Demaree's holding.
135. Demaree, 459 F.3d at 795; Turner, 548 F.3d at 1100.
136. Dillon, supra note 122, at 1044. This is a fairly deferential standard of
review, meaning that a majority of sentences are likely to be upheld even after
the "as applied" analysis is conducted.
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revised Guidelines. While courts should presume that in a
majority of cases the Ex Post Facto Clause will not be violated,
they should still consider the facts on a case-by-case basis. This is
the best way to preserve the constitutional guarantee that there
will be no ex post facto laws.

